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I. Introduction 
Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure 
rules for social behavior.  Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as 
“an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568).   
In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or 
policy design.  The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or 
failure as the intended policy outcome.  Good intentions or objectives are not enough:
the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and 
mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, 
matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and 
overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may 
influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue 
areas, governance systems, and time.  
Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, 
executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy 
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preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, 
campaign contributions, and elections.  Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law 
that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the 
ones that best pursue the public interest.
This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the 
legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design.  
It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called 
public choice, political economy, or positive politics.   This positive literature explores 
how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement 
policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal.  The 
positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape 
policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves. 
II. Normative Mechanism Choice:  Which Instruments Should We Choose? 
A.  In General 
Mechanism choice is a kind of social “engineering,” the task of designing optimal 
instruments to achieve social objectives (Maskin 2008: 567).  But as the history of 
engineering demonstrates (and as mechanism design theory corroborates), there is no 
such thing as a perfect design.  Every design involves choices among features that 
correspond to tradeoffs among competing objectives (Petroski 2004).
In economics, a core concern is mechanism design in the face of incomplete information.  
The significance of research addressing this concern is was reflected in the award of the 
2007 Nobel Prize in economics to Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson, and Leonid Hurwicz.  If 
preferences were known and outcomes were controllable, the designer could simply 
mandate actions and results.  But if the designer has incomplete information, s/he needs 
some mechanism to achieve optimal results by eliciting from actors their private 
information (honest preference revelation) via a mechanism design that is “incentive 
compatible.”  (Maskin 2008: 568, 571; Myerson 2008: 586-87).  Neoclassical theory 
argues that markets are presumptively best at this information-elicitation task, so long as 
they are competitive, are free of significant externalities, and without information 
asymmetries (Hayek 1945; Maskin 2008:  572).   
But if markets are flawed or incomplete, due to problems such as externalities, 
transaction costs, free riding, or incomplete information, then the theory of mechanism 
design seeks to choose the best form of government intervention to correct the market 
failure (Baliga & Maskin 2003).  Such market failures in competition, externalities, and 
information, and the need to correct for those failures, are among the basic rationales for 
public law (Stiglitz 1989).
At the same time, government policies to correct market failures can pose their own 
problems, that is,  government failures.  Incomplete information about preferences and 
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outcomes also confronts government decision makers.  Eliciting voters’ true preferences 
through voting may be elusive or even unattainable (classic studies include Arrow 1963; 
Gibbard 1973; and Satterthwaite 1975; more recent treatments include Barberá et al. 
1997; Benoit 2000; Reny 2001).  Foreseeing policy outcomes involves risk and 
uncertainty, so government incurs the costs of information and analysis as it tries to 
assess regulatory impacts in advance, and the costs of flaws in policy choices as they 
arise over time.  Government failures in policy design can include policies that are 
excessively costly, that disproportionately benefit parochial constituencies at public 
expense (rent-seeking) or government bureaucracies themselves (internalities), that 
allocate burdens unfairly (inequity), or that induce adverse side effects (derived 
externalities or risk-risk tradeoffs) (Wolf 1993; Graham & Wiener 1995; Mueller 2003).  
The challenge for optimal policy is thus to minimize the sum of market failures and 
government failures. 
One response, not uncontroversial, to mitigating the problem of government failure is to 
add a layer of supervisory oversight of the institutions developing policy interventions – 
that is, a system of regulatory review of those regulating the public.  In the United States, 
this has been implemented through both judicial review (at least since the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946) and White House oversight of agency rulemaking (at least since 
the administration of Jimmy Carter).  President Carter issued Executive Order 12044 and 
signed the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, creating the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  
President Reagan gave OIRA the power to apply benefit-cost analysis to regulatory 
review under his EO 12291, and President Clinton reaffirmed that approach in his EO 
12866 (with notable improvements).  (See generally Breyer 1993; Kagan 2001; Graham 
2007.  For a recent critique, see Revesz & Livermore 2008).  In early 2009, President 
Obama called for a updating the system of regulatory review, and nominated legal 
scholar Cass Sunstein to lead that effort.  In the European Union, similar oversight 
mechanisms have recently been established through the “Better Regulation” initiative that 
created the Impact Assessment Board (Lindseth et al. 2008; Wiener 2006; Renda 2006) 
and greater use of judicial review of administrative action (Lindseth et al. 2008; 
Alemanno 2008).  Internationally, regulatory oversight occurs in institutions including, 
notably, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute resolution bodies. 
Such oversight of regulatory design is a partial answer to the Roman poet Juvenal’s 
ageless question,  “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” (“who will watch the watchers,” or 
“who will guard the guardians?”).  It is only a partial answer because the additional 
oversight introduces another layer of costs (especially delay) and because the oversight 
body itself may require watching.  To avoid an infinite regress of oversight bodies, a 
system of transparency and of checks and balances, including public participation 
through elections and perhaps litigation, can help those being watched (that is, the public, 
regulated entities, and advocacy groups) also help watch the watchers (the oversight 
bodies) of the watchers (the regulators) (Hurwicz 2008). 
B.  The Regulator’s Toolbox 
3
Together, these contending concerns and institutions shape the choice of regulatory 
mechanisms.  Policymakers and academics collectively have developed a large menu or 
“toolbox” of instruments to correct for market failures.   
Perhaps the most common regulatory mechanism in historical practice has been the 
imposition of conduct standards, in which government specifies the behavior or 
technology that firms must adopt.  Examples include administrative regulations 
mandating technological standards (such as pollution filters or types of fish nets).  But the 
long history of research on mechanism design has developed many alternatives to 
conduct-specifying regulations, including taxes and subsidies (Pigou 1920; Weitzman 
1974), property rights (Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967; Hardin 1968; Libecap 1989), tradable 
allowances or “cap and trade” (Crocker 1966, Dales 1968, Montgomery 1972; Ackerman 
& Stewart 1985; Tietenberg 1990; Wiener 1999a; Stavins 2003; Tietenberg 2006; 
Tietenberg 2007), tax-allowance hybrids (Roberts & Spence 1976), information 
disclosure (Hamilton 2005), process-enhancing procedures (Richman & Boerner 2006), 
regulatory “nudges” that guide cognitive heuristics (Thaler & Sunstein 2008), and 
bureaucratic control (Williamson 1999).   
Each of these policy instruments has associated pros and cons; none is a costless 
intervention or perfectly efficient solution.  The challenge is to develop criteria and 
evaluation methods that identify the policy instruments that would be comparatively 
superior to achieve particular social objectives under particular market conditions.  We 
discuss these criteria further below. 
To flesh out the menu of mechanism choices in the regulator’s toolbox a bit further, it 
includes at least the following six types of instruments: 
1.  Conduct rules 
These instruments involve government commands to firms and individuals, 
prescribing specific technologies, practices, methods, or behaviors that must be 
employed or must be avoided.   These instruments mandate conduct, rather than 
outcomes.  (Related labels have included “command and control,” design 
standards, and technology-based regulation.)  Examples include administrative 
regulations mandating prescriptive design standards for technology to employ 
(e.g. pollution filters, catalytic converters, types of boilers or fuels, standards in 
information and communications technology) or technology to avoid (e.g. types 
of fish nets).
The judicial version of conduct rules was reflected in the traditional negligence 
standard in civil tort liability, in which “due care” is defined as particular conduct 
or technology that private actors must adopt.  This is still the approach in some 
areas of law, such as medical malpractice.  The more modern version of the 
negligence standard defines due care as “reasonable” conduct, evaluated by a 
benefit-cost test that asks if the marginal costs of precaution are justified by 
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marginal benefits of precaution, but leaving flexibility to private actors in how 
best to undertake precautions. 
2.  Quantity/Property rules 
These instruments limit the use of a resource or entry into a market by setting a 
quantity limit on such use or giving a property rightsholder the right to exclude.
If the market failure is overuse of an open-access resource (such a grazing 
commons, a fishery, or the atmosphere) that imposes external harms on others, 
then quantity/property instruments can remedy such failures by limiting access to 
the socially optimal amount.   
Such limits might involve spatial parceling of a resource (“private property”), or 
limited permits to use a resource, or limits on entry into a market.  They include 
property rights (such as rights to land, objects, minerals, airspace, and patents and 
copyrights), ambient standards (limiting the concentration or abundance of use or 
of pollution), emissions or effluent standards (limiting the amount of additional 
pollution that can be added in a period of time), and use or extraction licenses 
(such as for patents, copyrights, fishing and hunting licenses, airplane tickets, and 
broadcast spectrum licenses).  Quantity use limits can be fixed (non-transferable) 
performance standards (e.g. fixed pollution limits, highway speed limits, or 
airplane tickets); or they can be transferable among users in a system of tradable 
permits or tradable allowances (also called “cap and trade”; e.g. pollution 
emissions allowances, fisheries catch quotas, broadcast spectrum licenses, and 
aviation landing slots).
Tradable allowances can be issued by the government to private actors for free 
(such as “grandfathered” in proportion to historical users), or they can be sold or 
auctioned by the government to raise revenues and help offset the cost of the 
regulatory restriction (Goulder et al. 1997; Parry 1995), or some mixture of free 
and auctioned allowances can be designed.  A significant focus of the economics 
of mechanism design involves the design of auctions to try to elicit honest 
preference revelation by bidders (e.g. Athey & Levin 2001). 
Another key consideration in cap and trade policies, constraining costs, is 
discussed in the next section regarding the comparison between taxes and tradable 
allowances. 
Critics of incentive-based instruments such as tradable allowance mechanisms 
have worried that these instruments may lead to “hotspots” of concentrated 
pollution (e.g. if one firm purchases many allowances), may soften the stigma 
associated with polluting by “licensing the right to pollute,” and may have high 
administrative costs.  Advocates of tradable allowances respond that hotspots are 
unlikely if the aggregate cap is stringent, that hotspots depend on local emissions 
causing local harms (which is not the case, for example, with most greenhouse 
gases), and that hotspots can be limited through the design of the allowance 
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trading system to restrict high ambient levels.  They add that far from licensing 
the right to pollute, incentive instruments like taxes and tradable allowances make 
polluters pay for every unit of pollution (whereas command technology standards 
and fixed performance standards allow residual pollution to be emitted for free), 
and do better at motivating innovation, thus reducing pollution more effectively.  
And advocates argue that the administrative costs of incentive instruments 
(chiefly monitoring emissions and collecting taxes or tracking allowance trades) 
are no higher than for command technology standards (developing engineering 
analyses of best technologies and litigating those choices), and in any event are 
dwarfed by the social cost savings delivered by incentive instruments. 
3.  Price/Liability rules 
These instruments limit use of a resource not by limiting the quantity or spatial 
terms of use, but by setting a price on use.  If the market failure is overuse of the 
resource, then price/liability instruments can remedy that problem by setting a 
price for use that equals the social marginal harm of use.  Such price instruments 
include taxes on use, subsidies for abatement, and strict liability in tort. 
A classic contrast pits between taxes versus tradable allowances.  Under a 
quantity-based system of tradable allowances, government sets the aggregate 
quantity of use, and the market then determines the price of an allowance.  By 
contrast, under a tax, government sets the price for use, and the market then 
determines the quantity of use.  As Weitzman (1974) showed, if the government 
knows the true marginal cost of abatement, then it can set either the quantity or 
the price and achieve the same result.  But under uncertainty about the true 
marginal cost curve, the quantity instrument risks fluctuations in the cost of use, 
and the price instrument risks fluctuations in the quantity of use.  Which 
instrument is preferable depends (all other things equal) on whether one is more 
concerned about the costs escalating or the use escalating (that is, on the relative 
slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves).   
If cost escalation is a key concern (favoring a tax), but a quantity limit on total use 
is desirable or taken as given, then a quantity-based tradable allowance system 
can be designed to constrain costs in several ways: setting the stringency of the 
quantity cap appropriately (not too tight); enabling firms to enjoy “how” 
flexibility in methods of abatement, “where” flexibility in the location of 
abatement across users, and “when” flexibility through banking and borrowing 
over time; ensuring a broad and competitive market for allowances; and setting 
price ceilings (“safety valves”) at which extra allowances will be sold (i.e., by 
creating a tax-allowance hybrid instrument) (Roberts & Spence 1976), perhaps 
coupled with price floors that maintain at least some incentive for innovation and 
also help constrain price volatility in both directions (Burtraw et al. 2009).  
Taxes raise revenues; as noted above, tradable quantity allowances can also raise 
revenues by being sold or auctioned. 
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A key difference between taxes and tradable allowances is their ability to engage 
participation by users, especially where the voting rule for adoption of the policy 
requires consent to be bound (as it does at the international level).  This feature is 
discussed further in Part III below. 
Subsidies also act as price instruments, by offering users a payment to abate 
(hence a foregone payment from failure to abate), or by supporting basic research 
and development (R&D) in which private firms would not invest adequately.  
Subsidies for abatement can reduce resource use at the margin, but unlike taxes or 
tradable allowances, they may also reduce the average cost of operating in the 
subsidized industry and thereby attract greater investment that perversely 
increases output in that sector (Oates 1990).  Subsidies for basic R&D can help 
overcome the market failure in incentives for innovation, but unless the price of 
the new technologies can be driven down below the price of conventional 
technologies, the R&D subsidy will need to be paired with some instrument (such 
as a tax or tradable allowance system) to correct the market failure in resource use 
by internalizing the external costs of the conventional technologies and thus to 
encourage diffusion and adoption of the new technologies (Jaffe et al. 2005; 
Pezzey et al. 2008).  And government subsidies for the deployment of particular 
technologies run the risk of picking a losing technology. 
4.  Information disclosure rules. 
If the market failure involves asymmetric information, or obstacles to bargaining 
because of incomplete information, then an information disclosure instrument can 
help remedy the problem and facilitate more efficient market transactions.  
Information, transparency, labeling, and related instruments are widespread.  For 
example, information disclosure is currently required in sales of securities, sales 
and leases of real estate, loans, sales of and consumer products (such as 
appliances, motor vehicles, food, prescription and over-the-counter drugs).  Some 
of these disclosure requirements are highly detailed.  Additional versions of 
information instruments include Environmental Impact Statements, Regulatory 
Impact Assessments, the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard, and the Toxics 
Release Inventory (Hamilton 2005).  The function of regulatory oversight itself 
involves disclosure of decisionmaking rationales and evidence – by the agency in 
its notice and comment rulemaking process, by OIRA, and by the courts through 
judicial proceedings. 
5.  Government ownership 
If regulation of market transactions is not sufficient, government can acquire 
ownership of a resource or enterprise.  Government may acquire ownership 
through negotiated purchase, or through the power of eminent domain to take 
property (and pay compensation).  Public parks and lands, public works and 
utilities, and various services (including the Postal Service, Amtrak, and air traffic 
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control) are currently operated by the public sector in the USA; various sectors 
are government-owned in other countries.  Market failures in financial markets 
have recently led to increased government ownership of banks, lenders, and 
insurers.  Government ownership may enable wider public access to resources, 
but it may also replace market incentives to invest in conservation of resources 
with bureaucratic procedures that let resource values dissipate or become captured 
by private users.  Government acquisition or compensation in response to private 
losses can create an expectation of relief that generates “moral hazard,” excessive 
risk-taking by the insured (Akerlof & Romer 1994). 
6.  Private ordering 
Industry custom, trade association codes of conduct, professional codes, and 
group property management systems are all examples of mechanisms that private 
actors may adopt to regulate conduct.  Where actors face low transaction costs of 
developing, agreeing on, monitoring and enforcing such codes, they can be 
attractive mechanisms (Ostrom 1990; Ellickson 1990).  The question of 
instrument choice remains: private codes of conduct and social norms typically 
take one of the mechanism design options described above. 
The relationship between government policy and private ordering may vary.  In 
some cases, government adoption of regulatory policy may supersede or crowd 
out private codes and norms.  In these cases, private codes are sometimes meant 
to fend off government regulation; an example is the history of self-regulation by 
the movie industry meant to avoid government-imposed content ratings or 
restrictions.  In other cases, government policy may serve an expressive function 
that helps establish and strengthen social norms. 
Other instruments are also possible.  For example, Dijkstra (1999) classifies education 
and training as a regulatory instrument. 
C.  Criteria for Optimal Instrument Choice 
As a general matter, there is no single universally optimal mechanism or policy 
instrument, because the choice is pragmatic, involves several considerations, and is 
largely driven by the attributes of the specific market failure (Breyer 1982; Baumol & 
Oates 1988).  The economics and legal literatures have offered useful, though not 
exhaustive, theories for optimal mechanism choice, the process of selecting the optimal 
instrument to correct a particular problem.   
Perhaps the most common method of normative mechanism selection, at least as 
advocated by economists and invoked by OMB regulatory review, is benefit-cost analysis 
(Stokey & Zeckhauser 1978; Munger 2000).  The debate over benefit-cost analysis is 
extensive; it goes beyond the scope of this chapter, because benefit-cost analysis seeks to 
answer how much regulation is desirable, whereas mechanism choice typically seeks to 
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select the best policy instrument to achieve a given degree or objective of regulation 
(with that goal having been given by the legislature).  Thus, mechanism choice in 
regulatory policy often involves cost-effectiveness analysis rather than full benefit-cost 
analysis.
In either case, a full analysis of benefits or effectiveness would include both targeted and 
ancillary consequences (Graham & Wiener 1995; Revesz & Livermore 2008); and a full 
analysis of costs would include compliance costs, general equilibrium social costs 
(Hazilla & Kopp 1990), and administrative costs (Ackerman & Stewart 1988).  A full 
analysis of benefits and costs would also include dynamic considerations, such as the 
degree to which an instrument spurs innovation (Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, 2003) or 
encourages absorbing new information and adapting to changing circumstances.
Distributional criteria, such as fairness or justice, can also inform a benefit-cost 
comparison of alternative mechanisms and policy outcomes.  Benefit-cost analysis can 
aim to maximize aggregate net benefits (the Kaldor-Hicks criterion), or can be applied to 
a more stringent test that would maximize net benefits while also ensuring that no 
individual is made worse off (Pareto-improving), by combining the optimal choice with 
compensatory side payments from its winners to its losers.  Broader versions of benefit-
cost analysis embrace all of these considerations, and both qualitative as well as 
quantitative analysis, in a “cognitive” or “warm” approach to pragmatic decision making 
that sees benefit-cost analysis as a tool, not a rule, to inform sound judgment by 
responsible officials (Sunstein 2000; Farber 1999; Wiener 2006; Graham 2008). 
On these criteria, many economists argue that for most externality problems (such as 
pollution), incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradable allowance (cap and 
trade) systems are superior to conduct rules that specify behavior or technology.  
Incentive-based instruments achieve results at lower cost, through “how,” “where” and 
“when” flexibility (as described above).  Moreover, incentive-based instruments 
stimulate continuous innovation, while command technology standards may stagnate 
innovation once the government-selected technology has been adopted (Jaffe, Newell & 
Stavins 2003).  (For surveys of instrument choice comparisons across diverse criteria, see 
Baumol & Oates 1988; Wiener 1999a.)   
Law and economics scholars have developed additional theories to guide optimal 
instrument choice. For example, Calabresi & Melamed (1972) developed a template for 
when property rules are superior to liability rules, focusing on transaction costs and 
judicial errors.  Weitzman (1974) identified tradeoffs between price instruments (such as 
taxes) and quantity instruments (such as tradable permits) when the decision maker is 
uncertain about costs and benefits.  Breyer (1982) described how matching the type of 
policy instrument to different types of problems can help solve market failures.  Stewart 
(1986) emphasized the basic choice in public law between replacing markets with 
bureaucratic controls, versus “reconstituting” markets through incentive-based 
regulations that exact performance while preserving substantial flexibility to market 
actors.  Baumol & Oates (1988) synthesized the economics literature on optimal 
instrument choice for environmental protection.  Williamson (1999) employed new 
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institutional economics to suggest when economic and political transactions require 
administrative management, including regulation or public agencies.
In addition, to supplement and test the predictions of ex ante prospective assessments of 
instrument design, the empirical (ex post or retrospective) study of the actual impacts of 
instrument design has been growing.  For many years few such retrospective studies were 
undertaken; according to a GAO report in 1999, of the more than 100 major rules issued 
by EPA from 1981 to 1998, only five were subject to ex post evaluations, with all of 
those five reviews occurring after 1997 (GAO 1999).  In recent years, retrospective 
studies have been undertaken more frequently.  One such study found that ex ante 
assessments tend to overpredict both the costs and the benefits of regulation, but that the 
costs of market-based incentive policies tended to be even more overstated than the costs 
of command and control technology standards (Harrington, Morgenstern & Nelson, 
2000) – put another way, that market-based incentive instruments are an even better 
option than is typically predicted.  Like ex ante assessments, retrospective studies remain 
challenged by the need to estimate counterfactual scenarios of what would have happened 
absent the policy (Coglianese 2002; Hammitt 2006). 
Retrospective or ex post studies (or real time monitoring) can be useful in at least two 
ways: validating and improving the methods of ex ante assessment to help them become 
more accurate predictions; and informing the process of updating and revising policies in 
light of new information (see Wiener 2006: 513-16).  The latter function – learning and 
revising policies – is an important part of the dynamic considerations in the normative 
choice among instruments, as noted just above.  That is, not only should the normative 
choice among instruments consider which instrument best promotes dynamic 
technological and behavioral change in society, but it should also consider the dynamic 
adaptability of the instrument itself as we learn about its performance over time (Farber 
1994; Ruhl 2005; Wiener 2004).   
Different instruments may be more or less adaptable, or more likely to adapt in different 
ways, as circumstances change.  Put another way, the positive political economy of 
regulation continues after adoption and during implementation, which in turn may be 
relevant to the normative choice of initial adoption. For example, consider the choice 
between a tax versus a cap and trade system to reduce pollution.  Under a tax, every 
taxpayer has an incentive to lobby to relax or remove the tax. And the tax authority, 
seeking revenues, has an incentive to keep the taxed activity going and generating tax 
revenues, and thus to set a revenue-maximizing tax that is lower (less stringent) than the 
optimal externality-controlling tax (Breyer 1982: 284; Bohm & Russell 1985: 437; 
Keohane et al. 1998: 314-15). These forces combine to yield pollution taxes that are 
suboptimally low.  Under cap and trade, by contrast, allowance holders quickly constitute 
a new constituency which will lobby in favor of keeping the allowances scarce – that is, 
in favor of enforcement of the cap – because lax enforcement means that their allowances 
lose value.  (An example is taxicab medallions in New York City: the city allocated just 
fewer than 12,000 taxi medallions in 1937, and, under pressure from medallion owners, 
forestalled the issuance of any additional medallions until 60 years later, when the city 
added just 400 in 1996  (The Economist 1996).)  Under thuese conditions, a cap and trade 
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system seems less likely to be relaxed through political pressure than is a tax.  If new 
information indicates that a more stringent limit on pollution is desirable than was 
initially adopted, the cap and trade system would then be more optimally adaptable than 
the tax; but if new information indicates that a less stringent limit is desirable, the cap and 
trade system might be less adaptable than the tax.    
Accordingly, instrument designers should build into initial instrument designs some kind 
of mechanisms for adaptive management – such as for periodic review of the stringency 
of the cap and whether it should be tightened or loosened in light of new information.  
Moreover, this dynamic adaptive consideration returns us to the initial problem of 
“mechanism design”: how to design instruments that are incentive compatible and elicit 
accurate information about costs and preferences.  Because preferences, as well as 
technologies and environmental conditions, can change over time, the instrument 
designer should build into initial instrument designs some mechanism to learn about all 
of these changes and adapt over time. 
In sum, normative evaluations of policy instruments rest on a wealth of valuable 
theoretical criteria, and emerging empirical research.  Yet actual policy choices often 
depart from normative guidance.  It is therefore important to understand the positive 
political processes that select actual policy instruments, the topic of the next section. 
III.  Positive Mechanism Choice:  Which Instruments Actually Get Chosen? 
The main question posed by the robust political economy literature on positive 
mechanism choice is whether positive political forces actually choose the instruments 
deemed optimal by normative analysis, or instead depart from the optimal choice to 
employ some other (suboptimal) instrument.  If positive politics do affect the process of 
mechanism choice, then political forces predictably constrain policy options or raise the 
costs of certain policy instruments.  Accordingly, understanding these political 
constraints (which may be impossible or too costly to change) should inform the 
normative instrument choice analysis.  As James Buchanan advised, one should 
understand the political system before prescribing normative instrument choice 
(Buchanan 1987).
Views of the political process vary widely, and instrument choice predictions depend 
heavily on the underlying model of the political system.  Here we focus on instrument 
choice in the United States given its particular set of political institutions and players.  In 
this section, we begin with optimistic models in which positive instrument choice 
emulates optimal normative choice.  Then we move to more pessimistic models in which 
positive instrument choice departs from optimal normative choice.  At each step, we 
assess the relevant empirical evidence and consider complications to positive models; we 
also address the politics of both administrative regulation and property rights.  Further, 
we  examine the roles of public attitudes that might produce results that are more mixed 
and nuanced than either the highly optimistic or highly pessimistic models.  Last, after 
focusing on positive instrument choice in the United States, we comment on positive 
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instrument choice in international treaties and in the European Union, in order to offer 
some comparative perspective on the role of basic institutional structures (such as voting 
rules) in shaping positive choices.
A. Optimal Choice 
If all individuals’ interests are effectively represented in the political system, positive 
mechanism choice may emulate the normative criteria for maximizing net benefits (and 
perhaps even compensating losers).  Lowi (1979) advanced a vision of pluralist 
democracy in which all citizens’ interests are expressed through organized interest 
groups, and government decisions thus optimally aggregate and reconcile citizens’ 
preferences.  Aidt (1998) arrived at the same socially optimal outcome through a more 
formal model, in which every individual is effectively represented by an interest group.
Even if all individuals are not effectively or equally represented by interest groups, 
optimal choice is still possible.  Becker (1983, 1985) showed that if the political process 
is a frictionless competition among interest groups, organized interests will bargain for 
their desired policy outcomes and, in order to secure adoption of their preferred 
programs, will propose policy mechanisms that reduce the costs (prices) of achieving 
their objectives.  This competitive bidding process dissipates the interest groups’ rents, 
and socially optimal policies result.  Similar intuitions underlie Wittman (1995) and 
Cowen (1994). 
Many observers doubt that such optimistic models depict the reality of American politics.  
Olson (1971) and others had argued that disorganized or diffuse interests would be 
unequipped to bargain effectively against concentrated interest groups.  North (1990) 
argued that Becker's model is unrealistic because significant transaction costs of 
expressing political voice make political influence difficult and unevenly available (see 
also Mashaw 1997).  Hahn (1989: 173-75) observed that, at least through 1989, Becker's 
optimism had not been borne out empirically in environmental regulation, where 
suboptimal instruments had often dominated the field (although since 1989, incentive-
based instruments for environmental protection have become more widely adopted, see 
Stewart 2001, Oates & Portney 2003, and further discussion below).
Recently, Croley (2008) has argued that optimistic pluralist models do depict the reality 
of actual American policy making, provided that the instrument choice and policy 
process are adequately shielded from the interest group biases of concern to Olson, 
North, Mashaw, and others.  For example, Croley finds that separating regulatory 
agencies from the Congress, and requiring administrative procedures to transparently and 
honestly execute benefit-cost analysis, can ensure that regulation achieves public interest 
benefits.  From a different institutional vantage point, Demsetz (1967) argued that 
bottom-up norms and judicial protections (rather than top-down legislative and 
administrative safeguards) can ensure the emergence of optimal policy instruments.  
Demsetz depicted the evolution of property rights as a process driven by the quest for net 
benefits, in which open-access resources become regulated by the establishment of 
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property rights to exclude, whenever the benefits of internalizing externalities rise to 
exceed the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights. 
B.  Suboptimal Choice 
1.  The Olson Model 
A more popular, and less sanguine, view of the political process was crystallized by 
Mancur Olson’s classic, The Logic of Collective Action (1971), first published in 1965.
In Olson’s framework, political voice itself is a collective good that is restrained by 
transaction costs and is thus subject to the difficulty of mobilizing collective action.  In 
contrast to optimistic models such as Aidt (1998), in Olson’s framework, public 
preferences are incompletely represented by interest groups.  Interest groups have little 
incentive to lobby for nonexcludable benefits that will be reaped by others, so they 
advocate only or at least mainly for excludable benefits they can appropriate to their 
members.  Members and groups prefer to free ride on nonexcludable benefits generated 
by others, so they underinvest in promoting legislation that would yield diffuse general 
interest benefits (and they underinvest in resisting legislation that would impose diffuse 
costs).  The result is that concentrated interest groups are able to obtain their own benefits 
and extract rents at a cost to diffusely held interests.
The public choice literature contains numerous applications of Olson’s interest group 
theory to explain legislation and agency policies that benefit industry at the expense of 
the general public.  Early work in political science accused the railroads (Kolko 1960) 
and military suppliers (Gerschenkron 1945) of distorting the democratic process to obtain 
legislation serving their narrow interests. A key concern in the 1960s was the problem of 
agency capture by regulated industry.  Earlier economic models of democracy had been 
developed by Bentley (1908) and Downs (1957).  What Olson (1971) added was an 
account of incentives, appropriability (excludability) and free riding in the political 
domain that helped formalize and generalize the analysis, showing that political voice 
itself can have public goods characteristics and thus go underprovided unless it is paired 
with private rewards.  Stigler (1971, 1975) and Peltzman (1976) took an analogous 
approach to explain economic regulation that favors concentrated interests over diffuse 
public interests, such as licensing regulations that restrict entry to markets and raise 
prices to consumers.  Buchanan & Tullock (1975) applied this theory to explain the 
emergence of policy instruments that reflect incumbent industry members’ preference for 
command-and-control standards rather than taxes or auctioned allowances, because taxes 
or auctioned allowances force industry to pay for their residual uncontrolled emissions, 
whereas command technology standards do not; thus, they argued, the prevalence of 
command technology standards in 1970s-era environmental law can be attributed to 
industry’s concentrated interest and political voice.
Wilson (1984) and Eskridge (1988) emphasized that Olson’s theory predicts more than 
just overprovision of narrow rent-seeking legislation that provides concentrated benefits 
to a few while imposing diffuse costs on the public.  It also predicts underprovision of 
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general interest legislation that provides diffuse benefits while imposing costs on 
concentrated interests.  Moreover, Olson’s theory forecasts ambiguous results in cases of 
diffuse benefits and diffuse costs, and delegation to another body (such as a regulatory 
agency) in cases of concentrated benefits and concentrated costs.    
2.  Theory Meets Evidence 
One significant challenge to Olson’s interest group theory is the empirical reality that 
much legislation has been enacted that yields diffuse general benefits while imposing 
costs on industry, such as environmental law and antitrust law, and the simultaneous 
reality that some economic regulation protecting concentrated industry interests has been 
undone.   There are at least two possibilities to explain this reality:  either the Olson 
theory fails to describe actual politics, or seemingly general-interest legislation is not as 
general-benefit oriented as it seems (and is actually driven by parochial rent-seeking).
On the first possibility, many critics challenge the core of the Olson approach, arguing 
that the theory is too simplistic to capture the reality of the emergence of general benefits 
legislation.  For example, Farber (1992: 60) observes:  “The Olson paradigm appears to 
have a straightforward implication for environmental legislation: there should not be 
any.... [T]he two basic predictions [of Olson's model] are that environmental groups will 
not organize effectively and that environmental statutes will not be passed.”  Revesz 
(1997: 561) says: “it is difficult to explain, in public choice terms, why there would be 
any environmental regulation at all.”  Schuck (1997: 566) considers the emergence of 
modern environmental law to be a “major predictive error of the new public choice 
theorists.”  Oates & Portney (2003) comment: “In fact, from [the Olson] perspective, 
what does seem surprising is the extent to which environmental advocacy groups have 
mobilized their constituencies so effectively. The benefits from programs to improve air 
quality on a national scale, for example, would appear to represent an Olsonian large-
group case, where it would be extremely difficult to organize environmental interests. But 
in seeming contradiction to the prediction of the theory, environmental groups have 
proved to be a very powerful force in the policy arena.” These criticisms join earlier 
observations that environmental law was an especially difficult case to explain with 
standard public choice theory (Posner 1974; Elliott, Ackerman & Millian 1985).  The 
strong form of the Olson theory thus seems unable to explain, or at least seems to 
underpredict, the adoption of general-interest legislation such as environmental and 
consumer protection.  Perhaps the inference to draw is that the general interest legislation 
that arises is the product of episodic abnormal politics, as we discuss below; and that 
Olson’s theory of normal politics favoring concentrated interests implies that, 
normatively, we would be even better off if we could have even more general interest 
legislation than we get in reality. 
Similarly, much of the history of US economic regulation and deregulation in the 1970s 
cuts against the Olson theory.  Whereas Olson, Wilson and Stigler predicted the lack of 
general interest legislation and the prevalence of legislation favoring concentrated 
interests, the 1970s exhibited the opposite: the rise of (ostensibly) general interest 
environmental and consumer regulation and the nearly simultaneous deregulation of rules 
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shielding incumbent industry interests against competition.  Horwitz (1989) recounts the 
repeal or reform of the very economic regulations in banking, transportation, and 
communications that the Olson/Wilson/Stigler theory predicted would be most dear to 
industry because those rules had delivered benefits to concentrated industry and had 
imposed diffuse costs on consumers.  McCraw (1984) documents a similar political story 
when certain deregulation efforts removed benefits from concentrated interests and 
bestowed general benefits on consumers.  To be sure, some other economic regulations 
have remained in place, including government relief policies that may benefit risk-taking 
banks over the general public (Akerlof & Romer 1994); and the partial deregulation of 
financial services in the last decade may reflect intra-industry rivalry and regulatory 
capture (Hardy 2006).  But the juxtaposition of sustained environmental regulation and 
significant economic deregulation still presents a strong challenge to the basic Olson 
model.
More generally, critics have doubted that focusing on industry’s parochial gains offers an 
adequate account of observed political outcomes, in part because so many other variables 
are also in play.  This suggests that Olson’s model suffers from foundational theoretical 
problems.  Attributing observed political choices solely to industry lobbying may be a 
fallacy of “post hoc, ergo propter hoc” (Mashaw 1997: 203).  Breyer (1982: 388 n.38) 
remarks:  “Interest group theories, as causal explanations of either the historical origins of 
regulation or the actions of regulators, suffer several drawbacks. Where they are limited 
to producers [i.e., industry], they are often inaccurate. They cannot fully explain 
environmental, health, [and] safety regulation.... If the theory is expanded beyond 
producers, it risks becoming nonpredictive and nonexplanatory. All regulatory rules and 
programs benefit some group or other.”  (See also Breyer 1984: 282, quipping that 
interest group theory is uninteresting where it is true, and untrue where it is interesting.)
Noll (1989: 1277) worries that “the evidence is still far from fully conclusive. . . . [There] 
is the lurking danger of tautology, i.e., of attributing causality to an inevitable 
consequence of any public policy action. It is impossible to imagine that regulation could 
be imposed without redistributing income. Hence, a look for winners in the process--and 
organizations that represent them--is virtually certain to succeed. Until fundamental 
measurement problems about stakes, power, and gains are overcome, analysts will not be 
able fully to predict and to explain the details of regulatory policy.” 
Alternatively, there is substantial evidence of the second possible reconciliation of Olson 
with the evidence: that the seemingly general-interest legislation that has been enacted is 
actually the result of the rent-seeking pursuit of parochial interests.  Many studies observe 
that economic interests routinely use purportedly general interest regulation to raise their 
rivals’ costs (on the general theory, see Salop & Scheffman (1983); Salop et al. (1984); 
Tollison (1991)).   For example, Ackerman & Hassler (1981) found that the sulfur 
dioxide air pollution regulations in the 1977 Clean Air Act required command technology 
standards (scrubbers) that favored high-sulfur eastern coal over low-sulfur western coal.
Incentive-based instruments such as taxes or allowance trading would have removed this 
parochial advantage.  In their view, this distortion of instrument choice was a victory for 
eastern coal, not for clean air.  Pashigian (1985) investigated the same statute and found 
that the “prevention of significant deterioration” (PSD) provision enacted in 1977, 
ostensibly to preserve clean air in areas with already good air quality, was adopted by the 
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votes of northern rustbelt states with poor air quality over the dissenting votes of southern 
and southwestern sunbelt states with good air quality.  He inferred that PSD was imposed 
(through majority vote) by the rustbelt states in order to suppress economic growth in, 
and industry relocation to, their cleaner rivals in the sunbelt.  Along similar lines, Bartel 
& Thomas (1987) found evidence that OSHA and EPA regulations protect large firms 
and rust-belt firms against smaller firms and sun-belt firms.  And in a different topical 
domain, McChesney & Shugart (1995) argue that antitrust law, while ostensibly 
promoting the general interest, has been captured to deliver special interest protections to 
industry segments.    
Another intra-industry strategy is to seek regulations that protect existing incumbents 
against the threat of new entrants.  This strategy arguably accounts in part for the 
“new/old” distinctions in many regulatory instruments.  New entrants tend not to exist or 
are not yet well organized politically, so, following Olson, they lose out in the political 
process to well-organized incumbents with concentrated interests.  For example, 
Gruenspecht (1982) explained the preference of the current automobile manufacturing 
industry for more stringent restrictions on new sources of vehicle emissions.  A similar 
strategy by incumbents could help explain the tighter regulations imposed on new 
stationary sources of air pollution, including “new source review” and more stringent 
technology-based controls at new or modified sources.  Such a pattern of incumbent 
protection might also explain allowance trading systems with “free allocation” to current 
users, obliging new entrants to pay to receive permits or to purchase them from 
incumbents.   
Evidence of rent-seeking in the development and design of administrative regulation 
finds a parallel in studies that view the development of property rights as a rent-seeking 
strategy.  Whereas Demsetz (1967), as noted above, proposed an optimistic story of 
maximizing net benefits to explain the evolution of property rights to regulate resources, 
other scholars see a more coercive element of interest group politics in the evolutionary 
story.  In these versions, the definition and allocation of property rights is subject to 
political pressures.  Levmore (2002) tells a second evolutionary story that focuses on 
politics and rent-seeking, including examples in the development of intellectual property 
rights.  Wyman (2005) offers a similar account of politics and state power regarding the 
evolution of property rights in fisheries.   Libecap (2007) observes that the first-
possession or first-appropriation methods of assigning property rights that are often 
applied to oil and gas, water, radio spectrum, pollutant emissions, and fishery ITQs, – 
rather than auctions or uniform allocations, which often are more efficient – tend to arise 
to protect incumbents.  These political explanations of supposedly general-interest 
property rules are consistent with the Olson theory.
Thus, once competing intra-industry interests are appreciated, the evidence for and 
against the Olson theory of interest group politics presents a mixed picture:  
underprediction of general interest legislation (much enacted), overprediction of 
parochial economic regulation (much deregulated), and yet potentially accurate 
prediction of intra-industry rivalry embedded in both sets of policies. 
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3.  More Complex Models 
The models of positive choice discussed thus far have focused on the demand for 
regulation and particular regulatory instruments, and they have focused especially on 
organized private interest groups as political actors that demand regulation.  More 
complex models of positive politics look at a wider set of actors on the demand side, such 
as advocacy groups and political entrepreneurs, and also give attention to the supply side 
of legislation, such as legislators and regulators. 
Accounting for the role of advocacy groups that lobby for public interest regulation is not 
straightforward.  On Olson’s account, such groups should have difficulty organizing 
effectively because they generate diffuse nonexcludable benefits.  The inference might be 
that to the degree we observe advocacy from such groups, that effort is underprovided 
(compared to the social optimum) because free riding limits contributions to such groups.  
Moreover, much of the relevant legislation was enacted when advocacy groups favoring 
such legislation were not yet powerful; in the case of environmental legislation enacted in 
1969-72, many of the major environmental advocacy groups we know today did not yet 
exist or were fledglings (Farber 1992).
Additionally, advocacy groups that purport to mobilize on behalf of the public interest 
regularly pursue policy objectives that depart from utilitarian normative criteria.  Oates & 
Portney (2003), for example, observe that environmental groups historically opposed 
incentive-based regulation partly on the ground that these instruments might create 
“hotspots” that concentrated the adverse affects of pollution (as discussed above), and 
partly because they distrusted markets and favored bureaucratic control.  These advocates 
instead supported command technology standards rather than taxes or auctioned 
allowances, even though most economists viewed command technology standards to be 
inferior to incentive-based regulations.  Thus many advocacy groups joined with industry 
interests who similarly sought to avoid paying for inframarginal emissions (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1975), and the combined result was the positive political choice to adopt 
suboptimal instruments.  Oates & Portney also note, however, that in recent years, 
incentive-based instruments have been more widely adopted, raising the questions 
whether these interest groups have either lost influence or have changed their preferences 
regarding instrument choice. 
An intriguing hypothesis by Yandle (1989) is that many organized groups achieve their 
policy objectives only after joining forces with other organized groups, including those 
with whom they share little in common or even oppose.  Based on the story of the odd 
political alliance between Baptists and bootleggers to impose Sunday closing laws on 
liquor stores – in which Baptists sought to ban (at least official) liquor sales on the 
Sabbath, and bootleggers sought to shut down their (legal) rivals for one day a week – 
Yandle suggests that both environmental advocacy groups and industry achieve their 
desired policy outcomes when they ally together.  Such cooperation thus generates laws 
that (purport to) limit pollution and while also favoring one industry segment over 
another.  This kind of strategy may explain the air pollution laws discussed above that 
favored one industry region over another, the choice of command technology standards 
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rather than taxes or (auctioned) allowances, and the new/old distinction favoring 
incumbents.  And it further suggests that while advocacy groups may be influential in 
raising issues on the political agenda to spur adoption of laws, their influence is 
dependent on joining forces with industry which in turn works to torque the detailed 
content of those laws to favor incumbent industry interests (Wiener 1999b). 
In addition to advocacy groups, the policymaking process also includes what are 
commonly called “policy entrepreneurs” (or political entrepreneurs) who capitalize on 
diffuse and even inchoate public preferences to propose and develop support for new 
policy designs.  Such actors were not emphasized in Olson (1971), perhaps explaining 
some of his failure to predict the coming wave of consumer and environmental legislation 
and of economic deregulation, but the role of policy entrepreneurs was highlighted by 
Wilson (1984: 370-71), Eskridge (1988: 285), Arnold (1990), and Schroeder (1998).
Policy entrepreneurs may serve some or all of at least five kinds of functions.  First, they 
lower the transaction costs of political awareness and voice through campaigns to collect 
and disseminate information.  Similarly, policy entrepreneurs monitor policy adoption 
and implementation by institutions—monitoring that interest groups are not sufficiently 
incentivized to do themselves—by publicizing results and checking lapses in 
performance.  Second, they construct a narrative or vision of social ills (often including 
blame) and of the good society (including the payoffs of action) that help overcome free 
riding and mobilize diffuse—or rival—interest groups to advance policy objectives.
Third, rather than merely reflecting existing preferences, policy entrepreneurs anticipate 
as-yet unexpressed or unformed future preferences of key constituencies – what Arnold 
(1990: 10) calls the ”potential preferences” of voters – and appeal to those forward-
moving preferences.  They may go further and shape new preferences through their 
narrative and vision.  Fourth, they help devise new instruments that reduce costs and 
improve performance.  This function is illustrated in the role of Environmental Defense 
Fund in designing and advocating market-based allowance trading systems to control air 
pollution (Keohane et al. 1998: 354; Oates & Portney 2003), and by the roles of 
regulatory reformers such as Alfred Kahn (at the Civil Aeronautics Board) and Stephen 
Breyer (then chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee) in the 1970s in 
deregulating industries such as aviation, banking, and communications (McCraw 1984).
In this capacity, the policy entrepreneur is more innovative and less political than the 
interest group competing to reduce costs envisioned by Becker (1983, 1985).  The 
entrepreneur is not just extracting rents or pursuing policy outcomes but is instead a 
creative modernizer who invents a new policy instrument, something akin to a 
Schumpeterian innovation in the public sector (Wiener 2001: 1350-52).  Policy 
entrepreneurship can arise from interest groups on the demand side of regulation, or from 
politicians and agencies on the supply side of regulation. 
More complicated models give greater attention to the supply side of producing 
regulatory policy.  These models suggest that Congress or its members may be “trolling” 
for interest groups with votes and campaign dollars, in order to “sell” regulatory 
legislation to these “buyers” by legislating benefits.  Congress can also sell benefits by 
exercising power over regulatory agencies to favor targeted interests.  Sometimes this 
transaction is complicated by rival bidders.  Wilson (1984), as noted above, hypothesized 
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that Congressional delegation to an agency is most likely when the issue is in conflict 
between concentrated interest groups on both the benefits and costs side; he suggested 
that Congress would likely write a statute expressing lofty ambitions but leaving the 
difficult tradeoffs to the agency.  Fiorina (1983) developed a model that predicts when 
Congress will delegate to courts versus agencies, and Schwartz, Spiller & Urbiztondo 
(1994) similarly suggested when Congress might delegate policymaking to courts 
through articulating statutory intent.  Lazarus (2004) examined how polarization in 
Congress may inhibit regulation. 
These delegation decisions—and the models that predict delegation—became especially 
significant following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), which not only upheld the agency’s authority to supply a reasonable 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but in particular, upheld EPA’s interpretation that 
the word “source” in the Clean Air Act authorized a form of emissions allowance trading 
(EPA’s bubble and netting policy) when Congress had left the statute’s wording unclear.
This case illustrates the role of the agency as policy entrepreneur, and suggests a role for 
the courts in interpreting statutes (or deferring to agency interpretations) that promotes 
normatively optimal instrument choices and checks the distortionary effects of positive 
politics on instrument choice. 
A related literature speaks to how Congress designs agencies in crafting and securing its 
preferred policy outcomes.  Both Bawn (1995) and Epstein & Ohalloran (1994) suggest 
that congressional politics can explain certain structural elements of agency design. 
McNollGast (1987, 1989) offer models explaining how Congress, through the 
Administrative Procedure Act and other procedural devices, established a rulemaking 
procedure to ensure that organized interest groups maintain control over agency 
policymaking and can alert Congress to agency actions that threaten the interest groups’ 
deal with Congress.  And McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) and Spiller (1990) illustrate 
how Congress monitors agencies after delegating to them substantial policymaking 
responsibility.  This literature explains how Congress can respond to political demands—
and thus reap the benefits from catering to organized interest groups—while still 
delegating policymaking responsibilities to agencies.  On the other hand, Seidenfeld 
(1992) and Spence & Cross (2000) argue that delegation to agencies can reduce the 
public choice distortions of Congressional legislation, and Croley (2008) argues that once 
such power is delegated, the APA and White House oversight help shield agencies from 
Congressional micromanagement – and thus from interest group demands – while 
ensuring both transparency and attention to social net benefits in agency rulemaking.  
A synthesis of these diverse approaches is developed by Keohane, Revesz & Stavins 
(KRS) (1998), which proposes a model with many of the complicating factors discussed 
above.  KRS offer a supply and demand model to explain both environmental regulatory 
instrument choices and when those choices depart from instruments that are normatively 
preferred by economists.  In their model, Congress is the supplier of regulation to a set of 
demanders that includes both the voting public and interest groups.  On the demand side, 
KRS account for transactions costs of political voice and free riding (in line with Olson 
1971 and North 1990, and unlike Aidt 1998) so that interest groups do not fully represent 
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public interests but rather promote parochial special interests.  Like Yandle (1989), they 
allow for multiple interest groups which may compete or enter into coalition alliances.  
Like Buchanan & Tullock (1975), they observe that industry prefers command 
technology standards rather than taxes or auctioned allowances (because the latter force 
firms to pay for residual uncontrolled emissions) and that incumbents prefer tighter 
controls on new entrants.  And like Oates & Portney (2003), they observe that 
environmental groups have also historically preferred command technology standards, 
although KRS suggest that niche-seeking competition among environmental groups may 
diversify these views toward support for incentive-based instruments (while calling for 
more empirical research on what advocacy groups actually seek).   
KRS then add attention to the supply side: the provision of legislation by Congress.  In 
their model, legislators seek re-election, which depends on both votes and interest group 
support, but because of a rising marginal cost curve for legislation, interest group 
demands cannot be fully met and instead there will be an equilibrium of demand and 
supply in the market for legislation.  One consequence, they suggest, is that Congress 
may prefer command technology standards when it is more costly to learn about newer 
incentive-based instruments rather than continue employing familiar traditional 
instruments.  KRS observe that Congress might also prefer command standards if they 
are more effective at dictating the distributional impacts of regulation on constituencies.
(Command standards may more easily dictate the distribution of environmental impacts 
than do taxes or allowance trading [which afford “where” locational flexibility in 
abatement by sources, and hence reduce costs but may raise concerns about hotspots], but 
allowance trading systems may more easily dictate the distribution of compliance costs
through the allocation of allowances among sources.)  But like Becker (1983, 1985), KRS 
also find that interest groups have incentives to compete over time to offer Congress less-
costly mechanisms to achieve the groups’ desired goals, because Congress cares about 
reducing costs in order to attract votes from other affected constituencies.  Consequently, 
when there is no embedded interest group deal securing existing instruments, incentive-
based instruments are more likely to be adopted to address new issues.
KRS argue that these factors combine to help explain the observed shift over time toward 
adoption of cap-and-trade allowance systems with allowances allocated for free to 
historical users (“grandfathering,” preferred by industry), tight caps (preferred by 
environmental groups), fewer total social costs to voters compared to alternative 
instruments, and learning over time by legislators about the success of these instruments.  
Incentive instruments such as cap-and-trade will also gain a more receptive audience 
among legislators when distributional impacts are favorable:  when concerns about 
hotspots are attenuated (such as for greenhouse gases, which mix globally in the 
atmosphere) and when allowance allocations and/or revenues from taxes and allowance 
sales can be used to soften the distributional burden of the regulatory policy (DeShazo & 
Freeman 2007).     
One illustration of this shift in instrument choice can be seen in the policies adopted to 
control acid rain from sulfur dioxide emissions in 1977 and 1990.  Whereas the 1977 
Clean Air Act effectively mandated command technology standards (scrubbers) at coal-
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fired power plants, a choice that favored eastern high-sulfur coal over western low-sulfur 
coal (Ackerman & Hassler 1981), the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments imposed quantity 
trading (tradable allowances or cap-and-trade), a choice that encouraged coal-fired power 
plants to switch from high-sulfur to low-sulfur coal.  What explains this shift in 
instrument choice, and the reversal of eastern coal’s earlier interest group victory?  
Joskow & Schmalensee (1998) use a hybrid political economy explanation to account for 
the change in regulatory regime.  First, consistent with Becker (1983), they argue that the 
high social cost of the 1977 command technology instrument led the regulated parties and 
Congress to seek a less-costly alternative system in 1990.  Additional factors were also at 
work.  Second, the physical features of the acid rain problem—which prompted the 1990 
Amendments—also lent themselves to a cap-and-trade instrument.  The emissions of the 
targeted pollutant (sulfur dioxide) were spread regionally (diminishing hotspot concerns, 
though the issue was still raised),  generated by widespread sources with varying costs of 
control, and capable of being monitored inexpensively at each smokestack.  Third, on the 
demand side, acid rain was perceived to be a growing social problem, so the electorate 
associated the new law with increasing social benefits.Fourth, on the supply side, changes 
in political leadership in the late 1980s helped prompt the policy change by strengthening 
the hand of leaders from states receiving acid deposition: in the Senate, Robert Byrd, 
from West Virginia, a coal producing state, gave up his post as Senate Majority Leader to 
George Mitchell, from Maine, a victim of acid rain; and Ronald Reagan, from California, 
was succeeded in the White House by George H.W. Bush, from New England.  The 
switch to cap and trade in 1990 was also facilitated by a bipartisan learning process called 
“Project ’88,” led by Senators Tim Wirth (Democrat) and John Heinz (Republican) and 
staffed by Robert Stavins, which explained the success of prior allowance trading 
systems (such as in phasing out lead in gasoline) and thus helped legislators learn about 
these instruments and their net benefits.   And policy entrepreneurs became active in 
promoting a policy change.  The Environmental Defense Fund – an environmental group 
carving out its niche as an advocate of incentive-based instruments - helped design the 
1990 Acid Rain Trading Program for the new Bush administration (KRS 1998: 354).   
Although the Joskow & Schmalensee hybrid model and the additional factors we have 
noted here represent more a mosaic description than a formal model, this analysis reveals 
that at least one substantial policy instrument change – on acid rain -- is best understood 
by moving beyond the narrow focus on industry interests emphasized by the Olson model 
and its progeny, and by instead including a wider array of interests and political forces on 
both the demand and supply side.  Further analysis could address the use of a cap and 
trade instrument design in subsequent air pollution regulation, such as the major Clean 
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) promulgated by the Bush administration in 2005 to further 
reduce SO2 and NOx emissions. 
C.  Public Attitudes 
The approaches discussed so far focus mainly, though not exclusively, on the role of 
organized interest groups in shaping instrument choice.  But can the views of 
unorganized voters – public attitudes – also influence instrument choice?  This subsection 
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addresses that question.  The answer is yes, but the implications for instrument choice are 
mixed. 
Several models of democratic governance have incorporated voter sentiments into policy 
outcomes.  Downs (1957) developed a simple but influential model in which voters, of 
varying ideological preferences, acted directly and individually without organized interest 
groups.  In that model, legislators seeking re-election thus adopt laws that satisfy the 
preferences of the median voter.  Even in a world of interest groups, public attitudes can 
still matter.  Denzau & Munger (1986) model the views of the unorganized general public 
as the slope of the hill up which interest groups must push their lobbying agenda toward 
adoption.  That is, the more widely or intensely general public holds a viewpoint on some 
issue, the more difficult it is for interest groups to overcome that viewpoint.  This idea is 
similar to Becker (1983, 1985), in which interest groups compete to offer legislators 
policy designs that reduce costs and thereby please the general public (voters), and more 
directly entails the approach in KRS (1998), which depicts an upward sloping supply 
curve for legislation.  Even some of the most formal economic models explicitly 
incorporate the influence of popular, dispersed, and unorganized voters (see, e.g., 
Peltzman 1976).   
A more ambitious theory of public attitudes goes beyond, or overcomes, interest group 
politics, at least in unusual episodes.  This is the approach of adherents of “republican 
moments” in which mass movements depart from “normal” politics to achieve 
transformative political change.  Pope (1990) and Morone (1990) discuss the 
phenomenon in politics, and Ackerman (1998) argues that such republican moments have 
transformed American constitutional law and its understanding at key intervals such as 
the New Deal.  Farber (1992) sees the wave of environmental legislation enacted in the 
early 1970s as a republican moment that overcame interest group politics (rather than 
reflected a new interest group alignment). Elliott et al. (1985) explain the early 1970s 
wave of environmental law as partly a strategy by national industry to replace a 
patchwork of state laws with uniform national laws, and partly a race to the top (to be 
more “green”) between presidential candidates Nixon and Muskie, but they do not 
address (and appear to assume) the underlying change in public attitudes that evidently 
motivated both the enactment of the state laws and the candidates’ race to the top.
Schroeder (1998) argues that the republican moment that spawned the major 
environmental laws in the early 1970s was plausibly a result of rational voting and 
rational response by elected leaders.  Speth (2008) and Purdy (2008) see – or hope for – a 
coming transformation in public attitudes to address global climate change. 
The theory of republican moments may explain the origin of major laws, but its 
implications are unclear for the details of instrument choice.  For example, the 1960s/70s 
republican moments may have overcome opposition to environmental and consumer 
protection, but it is less obvious that the mass movement influenced the choice between 
command technology standards, taxes, and allowance trading.  It is possible that what are 
perceived to be republican moments are actually coalitions of Baptists and bootleggers 
(or are coopted by such coalitions), which would help explain why the surge of 
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democratic mobilization in the 1970s lead to suboptimal instruments that protect 
incumbents (Yandle 1989).   
Alternatively, the republican moment may influence instrument choice through framing 
effects.  Perhaps the narrative of the mass movement, rooted in its critique of markets and 
economic growth, also swept aside economic incentive instruments in its zeal for direct 
government control, questioning, in effect, whether market-based instruments could be 
the solution when market failure is the cause for environmental ills.  Depicting markets as 
the problem and pollution as a sin requiring expiation may have tilted public support 
toward absolutist government edicts (Margolis 1996: 25).  Framing market-based 
incentive instruments as “licensing the right to pollute” and “commodification” may have 
tarnished those instruments in the public eye, even if the reality was otherwise (Nash 
2006).  It may have taken two or three decades, including experience with successful 
market-based incentives and the failure of central planning in the Soviet Union, to change 
that public attitude (and legislators’ understanding) toward acceptance of the idea that 
market-based incentive instruments can repair and reconstitute markets (Stewart 1986).  
It took time to reframe the narrative, saying, in effect: it’s not that the environment is too 
important to leave to markets, it’s that the environment is too important to leave out of 
markets (Wiener 1999a: 724). 
Framing of instrument choice may be catalyzed by crisis events. Public attitudes and 
perceptions, including republican moments, appear to be influenced by and responsive to 
cognitive heuristics and biases that translate into political mobilization.  On heuristics 
generally, see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982); Slovic (2000); Sunstein (2005).  In 
particular, the availability heuristic (Sunstein & Kuran 1999) focuses attention on recent 
visible unusual events, leading people to overestimate low-probability risks and 
underestimate routine familiar highly likely risks (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982; 
Krier & Noll 1990).  Thus, crisis events may be crucial in spurring political responses 
(Percival 1998; Dominic & Madin 2008).  The history of regulation reveals numerous 
examples, from the Cuyaoga River catching fire, the death of Lake Erie, and toxic waste 
under Love Canal in the 1970s, to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals, and the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks.  Percival (1998: 20-22) argues 
that a “trigger” event like these is needed to spur new legislation.  A longer memory 
includes the Triangle Shirt factory fire, which spurred workplace safety regulation, 
although its political impact arguably faded over time (Stein 2007: 787-88).  These 
theories on the intersection of public attitudes and cognitive heuristics might explain why 
certain events trigger republican moments.  Still, the relationship is not deterministic.  
Some regulation occurs without an immediately preceding crisis event, and not every 
crisis event spurs regulation (Kahn 2007).  Processes of social amplification are only 
triggered in some cases. 
Cognitive focus on “available” crisis events also has a crowding-out effect on other 
motivations for regulatory policy, as it arguably leads to public neglect of both routine 
familiar risks and also remote catastrophic risks.  Catastrophic risks, such as asteroid 
collisions, abrupt climate change, pandemics (Posner 2004; Sunstein 2007) and financial 
collapse (Taleb 2006), threaten huge damages.  But these kinds of extreme ultra-low 
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probability catastrophic risks are neglected (even as low-probability but “available” 
visible crises evoke strong responses) because the catastrophic event occurs so rarely that 
it is not within the memorable experience that gives rise to the availability heuristic 
(Slovic & Weber 2002).  And public attitudes may be subject to “mass numbing,” 
responding intensely to the plight of a single individual but remaining unmoved by the 
plight of thousands or millions (Slovic 2007).   
If so, the upshot is that the public responds to recent visible crises (more strongly than do 
experts, who calculate probability times impact), but the public neglects (compared to 
experts) both routine widespread risks and rare catastrophic risks.  Breyer (1993) and 
Posner (2004) bemoaned the influence of these heuristics on public attitudes, and in turn 
on Congressional priority-setting, as a suboptimal distortion of regulatory priorities that 
Breyer (1993) termed the “vicious circle.”  Thaler & Sunstein (2008) propose 
opportunities to use framing effects proactively to shape heuristics and improve 
regulatory policy. 
The influence on instrument choice of these heuristic public attitudes requires additional 
inquiry.  The crisis-response dynamic and its framing narrative may tend to favor 
regulatory designs that employ strict government edicts (“never again”or “zero 
tolerance”), such as command technology standards in environmental policy, stringent 
regulation of financial institutions, and aggressive homeland security policies that 
impinge on liberty and privacy.  On the other hand, financial crises have often been met 
with adoption of strong information disclosure instruments (both in the New Deal 
securities laws, and in the Sarbanes-Oxley law following the Enron and Worldcom 
scandals).  Likewise, the Bhopal chemical plant disaster was followed by the information 
disclosure requirements in the Toxics Release Inventory (enacted in 1986) and the risk 
management plans under Clean Air Act section 112(r) (enacted in 1990).  These 
examples suggest a role for incentive-based instruments in some cases of crisis response.
And to forestall what some call a looming climate crisis, the current political enthusiasm 
for cap-and-trade instruments (as opposed to other instruments) to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions appears to derive from several factors: the expected cost savings, learning over 
time about instruments, the desire for effective caps on emissions, and the distributional 
attractiveness of deploying some allowance allocations to mollify critics and recycling 
allowance auction revenues to cut other taxes, all with little or no risk of environmental 
hotspots (DeShazo & Freeman 2007; Wiener 2008).  Perhaps actually experiencing a 
major climate crisis (worse than Hurricane Katrina – say, Greenland ice melting and 
flooding lower Manhattan and Florida) – would spur adoption of instruments that are not 
so incentive-based, such as geoengineering strategies to cool the planet directly. 
In sum, public attitudes appear to affect instrument choice, through unorganized voters’ 
preferences, episodic republican moments, and heuristic framing effects especially after 
available crisis events.  But the direction and degree of amplification of these effects on 
instrument choice is mixed or unclear.  Further empirical research could seek to 
disentangle these effects and test their relative influence. 
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D.  Positive Choice at the International and Supranational Level 
The theories and evidence assessed thus far have all examined positive politics in the 
United States, at the federal level.  That system has particular constitutional features, 
including voting and election systems, campaign finance laws, legislative majority rule, a 
bicameral national legislature, separation of powers with the possibility of a presidential 
veto, federalism with the possibility of subnational regulation, and judicial review.  It also 
has a distinct political culture.  These features are obviously different in other political 
systems.  Many countries employ parliamentary legislative systems, in which the prime 
minister necessarily has a majority in the legislature.  Some impose restrictions on 
political expenditures by interest groups, and some have more deferential doctrines of 
judicial review.
These and other kinds of variation in political institutions seem bound to affect the 
positive politics of mechanism choice.  Below we suggest further research on this 
question.
A comparative analysis of the positive politics of instrument choice across countries is a 
worthy endeavor but beyond the scope of this paper.  Here we offer two examples of 
positive instrument choice in other systems that may help put the US system and 
experience in context:  international environmental treaties, and the European Union.  
Both illustrate the importance of the voting rule for adoption of law (see Buchanan & 
Tullock 1962). 
1.  International environmental regulation: CFCs and GHGs 
There is no strong positive theory of global regulation.  Standard public choice theory 
predicts even less regulation at the global level than at the national level because global 
beneficiaries are even more diffuse, industry cost-bearers are still concentrated, and – 
crucially –the voting rule for international treaties holds that countries must consent to be 
bound and hence must perceive national net benefits (broadly construed) to decide to join 
(unlike national majority rule or fiat, which can impose costs on dissenters) (Wiener 
1999a, 1999b).   As Farber (1997: 1314) reports, “The basic principle of international 
law, after all, is that it binds states only with their own consent.” 
Moreover, rent-seeking (and the bootlegger side of Baptist-bootlegger coalitions) might 
seem more difficult under the consent voting rule at the international level than under the 
majority or fiat voting rule at the national level.  Rent-seeking depends on the coercive 
power of the state to shift gains from losers to winners (Wiener 1999b: 769-771; Posner 
1971; Posner 1974: 344; Peltzman 1976).   Indeed, Mueller (1976: 401-03 & n.9) opined 
that for this reason, rent-seeking in international agreements is “out of the question,” 
though adding a caveat that there may be distributional battles over the joint gains from 
cooperation. Moe (1990: 221, 222 n.9) argued that “the unique thing about public 
authority is that whoever gets to exercise it has the right to tell everyone else what to do, 
whether they want to do it or not .... Public authority gives [the winners] the right to make 
themselves better off at [the loser's] expense. Their decisions are legitimate and binding. 
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...  This kind of outcome-- redistribution that makes some people better off and some 
people worse off-- is alien to the economic world of voluntary exchange.”  According to 
this view, one would expect little, if any, rent-seeking regulation in the international 
arena of voluntary agreements.  
Yet as an empirical matter, the reality is that there is significant regulation at the global 
level, more than would be expected under standard public choice theory.  And there are 
some attempts at rent-seeking under international treaty regimes as well (Wiener 1999b; 
Mattli & Woods 2009).  Countries are complex plural entities, not monoliths, so rent-
seeking can occur within each country governed by majority rule or more coercive 
institutions; but regulation and rent-seeking are more surprising under the consent rule of 
international treaties.  Seeking to explain this puzzle, Keohane (1983) and Ostrom & 
Keohane (1996) compare global treaty law to local systems of group property and argue 
that international regimes arise to facilitate the benefits of cooperation.  Such  regimes 
can succeed in situations of low transaction costs, repeat playing (long-term 
relationships), strong social norms, direct benefits and side payments to cooperate, and 
monitoring and sanctions for violations.  Wiener (1999a, 1999b) hypothesizes that 
consent-based political systems (such as international law) are (i) less likely to adopt law 
than are more coercive political systems such as fiat or majority rule; (ii) less likely to 
adopt laws that impose costs or adverse side effects on parties than are more coercive 
systems such as national law; and, when they do adopt regulatory law, consent-based 
political systems such as international treaties are (iii) more likely to adopt allowance 
trading than to adopt either command technology standards or taxes.  The first two 
hypotheses are consistent with Buchanan & Tullock (1962) who show that as the voting 
rule moves along the spectrum from fiat to majority to unanimity (i.e., from coercive to 
non-coercive systems), the costs of adopting law rise but the costs imposed on dissenters 
decline. The third hypothesis on the pattern of instrument choice follows, Wiener (1999a) 
suggests, from the lack of coercion and the need for side payments at the international 
level, which mean that allowance trading is better able (i.e. at less cost than alternative 
instruments) to attract participation, through the allocation of allowances.
For example, in the treaty negotiations over whether to phase out CFCs to protect the 
stratospheric ozone layer (a global public good), cooperation among countries required 
extensive negotiations and, ultimately, side payments to China and India through the 
Montreal Protocol Fund.  In selecting the regulatory instrument, the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol regime set quantity limits on production and authorized a limited form of 
allowance trading called “industrial rationalization.”  Meanwhile,  rent-seeking was 
significant:  US manufacturers of CFCs, who had initially opposed international controls 
on CFCs, switched positions in 1986 to press for an aggressive phaseout of CFCs in the 
Montreal Protocol, in part because they perceived profit opportunities in the new regime.  
Since US manufacturers were farther ahead in the production of CFC substitutes than 
were their competitors, a rapid CFC phaseout, although it would cost them some, would 
hurt their rivals far more (Wiener 1999b: 772-73; Litfin 1994: 108; Hammit & Thompson 
1997: 43; McInnis 1992: 129).  Although the US manufacturers no doubt would claim 
credit for making socially valuable investments in new products, their cooperation in the 
Montreal Protocol is clearly also consistent with an alignment of bootleggers and 
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Baptists, in which a rent-seeking industry sought to burden its rivals while environmental 
advocates sought to protect the planet. The Montreal Protocol’s success also shows that 
such rent-seeking could occur in the international arena within a consent framework that 
constituted a Pareto improvement to all parties (countries).  Indeed, a curiosity here is 
that the rival CFC producers (such as in Europe) went along – or perhaps were obliged to 
do so within their own national political systems. 
The negotiations over the international climate change treaties also illustrate the 
importance of the voting rule.  Progress has been slow because countries must consent to 
be bound, and several key countries have demurred.  The US never ratified and then 
withdrew from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in part because the US Senate had voted 95-0 in 
1997 not to ratify a treaty which lacked parallel commitments by major developing 
countries.  China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and other major developing countries have 
also resisted agreeing to limits on their future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  No 
doubt rent-seeking efforts are rife as different industries and energy sources seek to raise 
rivals’ costs through the restrictions imposed and subsidies doled out under a climate 
treaty regime.  Meanwhile, as to instrument choice, when the US advocated allowance 
trading in the 1990s,  the idea encountered initial opposition from many quarters, notably 
the European Union; but after considerable effort by the US to explain the benefits of 
allowance trading for greenhouse gases, that instrument was authorized informally in the 
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and more formally in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol (Wiener 2001).  A cap-and-trade system is likely to be the instrument adopted in 
future US and international climate policy as well because it enables cost savings, a cap 
on emissions, and a distribution of burden and of headroom allowances that best attracts 
participation, without inducing hotspots (Wiener 1999a; DeShazo & Freeman 2007). 
In the absence of formal international governance regimes, there is still room for “private 
governance,” including self-regulation by multinational corporations, codes of conduct 
promulgated by international organizations, and consumer standards monitored by NGOs 
(Gereffi & Mayer 2006).  Although private governance arrangements often arise in 
response to calls by consumer and political activists (Spar & La Mure 2003), they are 
also regularly products of rent-seeking and are sustained by industry initiatives not unlike 
those exercised in domestic politics (Wiener 1999b).  Private coalitions that drive the 
formation of international agreements often resemble the purest forms of Baptist-
bootlegger coalitions, because political sentiment is so thin and political monitoring so 
sparse in the international arena.  Examples of coalitions with surprising bedfellows 
include the Kimberley Process, in which NGOs paired with DeBeers to remove conflict 
diamonds from the consumer market and to remove alluvial competitors from global 
supply (Richman 2009). 
2.  European Union environmental regulation: GHGs 
Historically, the EU has preferred environmental taxes over allowance trading (Andersen 
1994; Svendsen 1998; Wallart 1999; Harrington et al. 2004).  In the 1990s, the EU 
proposed a carbon tax and denounced the US proposal of allowance trading for GHGs.
But no EU carbon tax was adopted, and starting in 2001 the EU instead adopted 
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allowance trading for GHGs.  It has now implemented the EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS), the largest cap-and-trade system in the world.  Why the switch in instrument 
choice? 
Several factors help explain this shift that do not relate to the European Union’s 
supranational institiutions.  When the EU finally turned to implementing its Kyoto 
commitments, it realized that the ETS would impose lower costs than would command 
standards.  (But a tax would arguably have imposed even lower costs.)  Moreover, by 
2001 the EU had been able to learn from the successful US experience with SO2 
allowance trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act, as well as from several other cap-and-
trade systems in the US, Canada, New Zealand, and elsewhere, and came to realize its 
benefits.  (For discussions of Canada’s and New Zealand’s successful tradable permit 
systems to curb overfishing, see Wyman 2005 and Newell et al. 2005.)  The successes of 
allowance trading in the US and the benefits of this instrument for GHG control were 
presented to EU leaders in numerous fora, including an early seminar on market-based 
environmental policies organized by US government officials (including Richard Stewart, 
Richard Schmalensee, and Jonathan Wiener) in February 1990 for officials from the EU 
and other countries during an IPCC session.  This conversation continued through the 
1990s, and the great success of the US acid rain trading program put to rest many 
concerns about cap and trade (see Svendsen 1998).  Relatedly, policy entrepreneurs 
brought the theory and evidence of allowance trading systems from the US to the 
European Commission  (Peter Zapfel, who studied with Rob Stavins and Richard Newell 
at the Kennedy School, is now one of the key staffers at the European Commission 
running the EU ETS). And although the EU denounced allowance trading in the 1990s in 
part for reasons of symbolic politics – in order to shame the US and seek the upper hand 
in post-Cold War international relations -- after George W. Bush withdrew the US from 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the EU could easily shame the US without disparaging 
allowance trading.
Thus, by 2001, allowance trading had become a more politically and functionally 
appealing instrument for the EU and its member states.  But a tax might still have looked 
more attractive to EU decision makers.  To understand the EU’s shift from taxes to 
allowance trading, it helps to appreciate that the EU voting rules also played a critical 
role.  EU law required unanimity or consent among EU member states to adopt an EU 
tax, but poorer EU member states objected to a uniform carbon tax and blocked adoption.  
A cap-and-trade system, by contrast, attracted consent because extra allowances could be 
distributed to poorer member states.  Allowance trading enabled the initial distribution of 
burden to be decoupled from the question of the stringency of the cap and the market 
price for an allowance, whereas a tax could not be adjusted as easily to accommodate the 
comparative needs of the poorer member states.  The EU voting rules requiring unanimity 
significantly affected the ultimate mechanism chosen to control GHGs, favoring trading 
over taxes, as hypothesized by Wiener (1999a, 1999b). 
These two cases – international treaties and the supranational EU system – indicate the 
importance of voting rules and political institutions in the positive choice of policy 
instruments beyond the US context.  They also illustrate the fruitfulness of examining 
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how cross-national variation affects instrument choice, and implicate directly some of our 
suggestions for future research. 
IV.  Future Research 
The literatures on positive and normative mechanism choice are already extensive, and 
we do not pretend to envision the entire future of this field of research.  We instead offer 
here a few suggestions for future research, with a focus on the theory and evidence of 
positive politics – that is, on the public choice of mechanism choice.  
A.  Voting Rules.  Since at least Buchanan & Tullock (1962), scholars have investigated 
how different voting rules affect politics.  We have sketched here some variation in 
regulatory outcomes that can be explained by differences between, for example, the 
American versus European political systems.  We encourage future research to examine 
more systematically how positive instrument choice is affected by alternative voting 
rules.  Voting rules to be compared include fiat (e.g. dictatorships, Presidential executive 
orders, or edicts from corporate CEOs), majority rule (the standard case of rule by N/2 + 
1), supermajority rule (e.g. 60 votes out of 100 needed to end debate in the US Senate, or 
67 votes out of 100 needed for the US Senate to ratify a treaty), bicameralism (votes 
required in both the House and Senate, see Stearns (1994)), separation of powers 
(requiring both legislative vote and executive signature), consent (e.g. nations’ consent to 
an international treaty, neighbors’ consent to restrictive covenants, or firms’ consent to 
binding contracts), and unanimity (the extreme case of universal veto).  This research 
would easily translate into normative conclusions about the optimal instrument under 
each voting rule.  And we encourage inquiry into how options for side payments – 
mechanisms to compensate losers and thereby attract additional votes or consent – can be 
incorporated into alternative political systems. 
B.  Scale.  The size of the polity, communications among members, and vertical (federal) 
relations may also affect positive choice among instruments.  For example, the role of 
interest groups (factions), public attitudes, and regulators may differ at each scale 
(Revesz 2001).  Madison worried in Federalist 10 that small polities would be more 
vulnerable to capture by factions, but  others may worry that large-scale polities are more 
vulnerable to interest group capture because the transaction costs are higher for 
unorganized voters to learn about and monitor political decisions at higher scales.  
Innovations such as the internet may affect those costs.  Research should pursue these 
questions of scale, information costs, administrative institutions, monitoring, 
enforcement, and culture, to investigate how they may influence instrument choice at the 
local, state, national, and international levels. 
C.  Constitutions.  In addition to, or perhaps combining, the above issues of voting rules 
and scale, research could compare positive instrument choice in different constitutional 
systems of  government, such as republics (with separation of powers), parliamentary, 
authoritarian, and other systems.  For example, some have argued that public goods are 
protected better by democracies than by dictatorships (Congleton 1996: ch. 12), while 
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others have alleged the converse (Ophuls 1977).  Among democracies, one might 
investigate whether parliamentary systems are more likely to select certain policy 
instruments than are separation of powers systems like the US Congress in which 
opposing parties may control the legislature and the executive (Krehbiel 1998); and 
within each legislature, whether different committees (King 1997) or legislative 
procedures (Krehbiel 1992) affect instrument choice.  Of particular interest might be how 
constitutional designs enshrine current regulatory systems and make reform either more 
or less difficult.  Examining political feedback mechanisms to understand how initial 
mechanism choice becomes an explanatory variable for future mechanism selections, 
would contribute to our understanding of policy outcomes and change.  To be sure, path 
dependency is a common explanation for why policy instruments continue beyond their 
intended life, and mimicry might also explain parallels in mechanism selection across 
policy domains.  But political institutions also shape debate, perceptions, and resource 
allocations that can affect the political process.  Understanding the endogeneity of such 
mechanism selections might require more sophisticated models than those discussed here.  
D.  Topical domains.  We also encourage additional inquiry into how instrument choice 
varies across topical domains, such as environmental protection, energy, 
communications, transportation, workplace safety, food safety, financial markets, and 
homeland security.  In this paper, several models (e.g. Wilson 1984, McNollGast 1987, 
and Keohane, Revesz & Stavins 1998) discuss how different kinds of institutions might 
be prone to different instrument choices.  Future research might focus on how the 
particular attributes of different topical areas might call for different types of instruments 
(both normatively and in positive politics).  For example, environmental protection might 
be better addressed with instruments that differ from those best used in financial 
regulation, communications, homeland security, or food safety.
E.  Behavioral sciences.  New research in behavioral psychology, economics and 
neuroscience also offer significant returns to understanding mechanism choice.  Taken 
together, the burgeoning research in behavioral law and economics, neuroscience, 
psychology, and political science collectively offer opportunities to understand the 
sources and consequences of phenomena such as framing, biases, crises and availability 
heuristics, remote catastrophic risks, trust or distrust in social institutions, and related 
factors.  This improved understanding of actual behavior may be useful to the study of 
instrument choice in at least three ways.  First, better understanding of these and other 
behavioral factors may help predict which instruments will likely be adopted in response 
to particular conditions.  For example, as discussed above, some analyses suggest that 
market-based instruments often arise in response to mid-level crises, whereas major 
crises that seize the public’s attention often result in command-and-control regulation, 
especially if a narrative emerges from the crisis that demands expiation of sin and 
stringent edicts.  But we also noted counterexamples of market-based incentives adopted 
in response to major crises in financial and environmental settings.  Second, better 
understanding of behavioral factors may also help predict the influence of different 
instruments on human behavior.  For example, research is evolving on how instruments 
such as penalties, price signals, information disclosure and warning labels may actually 
alter patterns of human response, sometimes contradicting or qualifying the claims made 
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in normative theories of instrument choice about how such instruments will function 
(e.g., Ariely 2008).  Third, behavioral research may help identify new types of 
instruments that can influence human responses more effectively or less intrusively 
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008).  The behavioral science of instrument choice deserves 
additional attention, and a satisfying inquiry will likely require involve methodologies 
and perspectives.
F.  Political Institutions and Instruments. Finally, though we are wary of the search for a 
single grand theory, we encourage the pursuit of models that integrate demand, supply, 
entrepreneurship, public attitudes, and institutions, in order to shed more light on how the 
spectrum of different political systems intermeshes with the spectrum of alternative 
regulatory instruments. Although significant work has examined cross-national variation 
in political design (see, e.g., Berger & Dore 1996), we lack a dynamic understanding of 
how political templates correspond to templates of regulatory instruments.  And although 
there is a broad literature on the diffusion or transplantation of judicial doctrines across 
countries (Watson 1993), we are still groping toward a solid understanding of the 
diffusion or borrowing of approaches to administrative regulation across political systems 
(Lazer 2005; Wiener 2001, 2006).   
*    *    * 
Regulatory policy and mechanism design research have advanced a long way from the 
traditional template that called for command-and-control regulation to correct market 
failures; the menu of instrument choices in the toolbox continues to grow, and the 
selections actually made by legislators and regulators appear to be following somewhat 
more closely the normative recommendations of analysts.  Positive political research that 
predicted parochial rent-seeking regulation, based mainly on the behavior of organized 
interest groups, has been puzzled by contrary evidence, such as the growth of general-
interest legislation, the deregulation of economic regulation, and the shift toward 
adoption of incentive-based allowance trading systems in the US and EU.  And yet we 
also observe rent-seeking within ostensibly general interest legislation and in 
international treaty regimes.  Moreover, dynamic and behavioral factors play important 
roles.  In response, research has sought to incorporate a broader array of explanatory 
factors in more sophisticated models and hypotheses.  And empirical research is needed 
to test each hypothesis.  Together, these are moves toward a more comprehensive 
understanding of mechanism choice. 
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